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Abstract 
Since the mid-1970s a large body of research in science education has focused on identifying 
students’ ideas and difficulties in understanding science across a wide student age range. Whilst this 
research has informed the design of instructional approaches and curriculum development, it has 
contributed little to our understanding of how students reason when presented with a novel situation 
and the knowledge they draw upon to understand that situation. Currently there are two main 
perspectives on the nature of students’ knowledge: that of misconceptions and that of knowledge in 
pieces (p-prims). From the former perspective students’ knowledge is perceived as being theory-like 
and stable with students’ ideas being context-independent whereas the latter perspective sees 
students’ knowledge as composed of smaller, loosely organized, elements with their activation and 
subsequent arrangement into ‘strings’ being dependent upon the context of the situation students are 
trying to understand.  
In this cross-age study, conducted in Greece, students (n=166) aged 10 to 17 years were asked to 
make predictions about novel situations and then explain how they arrived at those predictions. We 
report here on a number of ideas identified in students’ explanations by considering how they can be 
seen either as misconceptions or, alternatively, as situated acts of construction involving the activation 
and arrangement of smaller p-prims. Although our purpose was not to judge the merits of one 
perspective over the other, we were better able to understand and interpret the ideas identified in 
students’ explanations in terms of p-prims already documented in the literature. Our results showed 
that students’ ideas were not theoretically grounded but rather appeared to be composed of 
independent ‘pieces of knowledge’ strung together in response to the contextual features of the novel 
situation they were presented with. Further research is now needed to better understand the nature of 
students’ knowledge and reasoning and how these could be directly linked to teaching approaches.  
 
1. Introduction 
By and large research in science education has focused on students’ ideas and understanding across 
a wide range of ages as well as on an increasing range of science topics. The findings of this research 
suggest that students experience difficulties in understanding and learning science as they struggle to 
relate what they are taught in school science with ideas they hold and are experientially based building 
on their experiences obtained via observations and interactions with the world around them [1].  
 
1.2 Students’ ideas as misconceptions  
A mix of terms have been used in the literature to describe these students’ ideas. Many researchers 
have used the term misconceptions to refer to explanations or understandings that differ from the 
scientific perspective whereas others have employed alternative terms, like preconceptions, 
alternative and naïve conceptions or alternative frameworks. Although there are differences in the 
philosophical positions of these terms it has been argued that they actually mean the same thing or 
that these alternative terms have been used as synonyms for the term misconception [2] (a term we 
use throughout the paper for all the synonyms of this term suggested).  
The common usage of all these various terms suggests that students’ conceptions: a) differ from 
experts’ concepts, b) have a strong influence in students’ understanding and c) must be avoided or 
replaced towards scientific understanding [3]. A recent debate about the nature of students’ ideas has 
added new connotations for the use of the term misconception. This ongoing debate, which began 20 
years ago, pits the coherence perspective against the fragmentation one. According to the coherence 
perspective, misconceptions implies the hypothesis that students’ knowledge is coherent or theory-like 
[3]. This view held that students have stable ways of thinking about topics in science because their 
understanding emerges from ideas that are cohesive and strongly integrated with other ideas [4].  
 
Current research, however, has come to largely reject this view that students’ ideas are theory-like as 
evidence suggest that they emerge from finer-grained, fragmented pieces of knowledge which are 
more loosely organized than ‘theories’ and their activation depends on the context of the situation the 
students try to understand and reason about [5].  
 
1.3 Students’ ideas from a knowledge in pieces perspective 
The most prominent voice in the fragmentation perspective is diSessa and colleagues [5] [6] who 
challenged accounts of students holding unitary ideas in the form of misconceptions by introducing the 
notion of phenomenological primitives (hereafter p-prims for short). P-prims are the basic finer-grained 
elemements which can be used to explain students’ reasoning and understading [7]. These 
fragmented pieces of knowledge are phenomenological in that they are minimal abstractions derived 
from experiences and closely tied to familiar phenomena and they are primitive in that they “stand 
without significant explanatory substructure or explanation” (p.15) [7]. Students’ ideas, therefore, do 
not exist as coherent theories, but are constructed in the moment from the activation of p-prims which, 
in turn, depends on the contextuality of the situation students try to understand and explain.  
The knowledge in pieces view challenges another aspect of the misconception perspective which is 
the relationship between students’ ideas and the scientifically acceptable ones. In the latter case, 
there is a mere perception of students’ ideas as showing an inherent inconsistency with scientists’ 
knowledge and that there is always a need for replacement of the ideas students hold before being 
exposed to school science in order to understand science. However, any approach that involves such 
a large scale replacement of prior knowledge is fundamentally at odds with constructivism and such a 
direct ‘’flipping from the misconceived view to the correct view’’ (p.10) [8] offers no account on how 
actually the change occurs and what happens to the prior knowledge abandoned. In contrast, the 
knowledge in pieces perspective perceives learning of science as a process of reorganizing students’ 
ideas into scientific knowledge acknowledging, at the same time, that they might be still present in 
scientists’ way of thinking [9].   
 
1.4 Misconceptions or P-prims: How different are the two approaches in terms of 
instruction? 
Researchers from these two different perspectives often suggest and implement similar teaching 
approaches as they both acknowledge that a student comes to school holding ideas and explanations 
about how things work in their everyday life and not as blank slates which can be easily fitted with 
scientific concept. As diSessa [10] suggests paying attention to students’ naïve ideas is powerful 
regardless of the details on how the change from these naïve ideas to the scientific ones take place.   
The only difference lies in the way the knowledge in pieces perspective interprets constructivism as it 
perceives students’ ideas as the resource upon which scientific knowledge can be built. Therefore, 
instead of challenging or replacing students’ ideas towards expertise, as the misconceptions 
perspective implies, expert knowledge can be achieved through a continuous construction and 
reconstruction of the knowledge students bring in the classroom. Instruction should guide students 
through that process by giving the opportunities to reflect on that knowledge. Teachers should find 
contexts in which their students’ ideas are and are not productive and then guide them to refine that 
knowledge accordingly [9].  
 
2. The study  
We have recently conducted a research in which we have attempted to identify students’ reasoning 
behind predictions made in situations they have not considered before. We report here on the ideas 
identified in students’ explanations by considering how they can be seen either as misconceptions or 
as situated acts of construction involving the activation of p-prims.  
 
2.1 Design aspects  
The research involved a cross-age study in which Greek students, ranging from 10 to 17 years of age, 
were asked to make predictions about six novel situations and then provide explanations about them. 
All of the situations were presented to the students in a pictorial form and were novel in the sense that 
they had not been asked previously to think and make predictions about them. A mixed method 
approach was used with data being collected through the administration of a paper-and-pencil survey 
and the conduction of group interviews (for more details about the study sample and the research 
methodology please see our previous work [12] [13]).  
 
3. Results and Discussion 
To a large extent, we were able, to interpret ideas in students’ explanations in terms of p-prims 
documented in the literature. For example, in the weight and gravity novel situation (Figure 3.1) most 
of students (116 out of the 166) articulated a rather common idea identified in the literature according 
to which heavier objects fall faster. The misconceptions perspective attributes to this idea a rather 
stable knowledge structure which directly relates time, speed and acceleration of a falling object with 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Weight and gravity novel situation 
its mass constituting in this way a scientifcally incorrect idea and a misunderstanding of free fall. The 
idea could be also interpreted from diSessa's [9] perspective as being constructed by the students in 
the context of this particular novel situation. The activation of Ohm’s and supporting p-prims could be 
used to understand this idea that heavier objects fall faster. The activation of the supporting p-prim 
(unsupported objects fall) in this case implies that since the ropes are cut and the objects are 
unsupported they will fall. Subsequently the Ohm’s p-prim is activated, according to which “the 
stronger the agency, the greater the effect” (p.104) [3]. With the agency in this case being that of 
weight, Ohm’s p-prim implies that the heavier an object is, the faster it falls. Ohm’s p-prim involves 
another common primitive, that of “the more x, the more y’’ (p.147) [9], and again, in this case the 
heavier the object the faster it moves. Both p-prims, diSessa [9] argues, are abstractions of everyday 
experiences which can be used to develop understanding of various situations. The supporting p-prim 
might be abstracted from and used to understand phenomena where objects placed on a supporting 
surface (table, rack) do not move and can explain related situations, whereas Ohm’s p-prim might be 
related with experiences where the more something or someone is pushed the farthest of fastest it 
moves [9]. The p-prims perspective, therefore, does not attribute a knowledge structure concerning 
weight and speed of falling. Rather, there is a more abstract element of knowledge concerning the 
agent's effort and its result. 
There have been cases in which there were correct elements in students incorrect responses (either 
the prediction was incorrect and/or the ideas used in students’ reasoning). The misconceptions 
perspective does not analyse these correct knowledge elements in students’ ideas. To illustrate, there 
have been two novel situations in which students expressed the very same idea of a decrease in mass  
of buring object. In the case of the burning a candle novel situation (Figure 3.1) this idea could be 
understood on the basis of the finer-grained knowledge element of something being used up in all 
processes (something used up p-prim as we name it). This is not inconsistent with the scientific 
account according to which carbon made materials being burnt are indeed losing weight (carbon 
particles in the candle react with oxygen in the air to form carbon oxides which is then given off with 
the reamining candle weighing less than before being lit). Thus, accordingly, students’ scientifically 
incorrect idea of a decrease in mass in the case of iron wool being burnt (Figure 3.3) could be 
understood as merely reflecting on the use of something used up p-prim outside its range of legitimate 
applicability as in this case, iron made materials (particles of the iron wool are chemically combined 
 
with oxygen durng the burning process, and thus, having oxidised to form an ‘ash’ of iron oxide, its 
weight would increase). 
  
      Figure 3.2. Burning candles novel situation            Figure 3.3 Burning wire wools novel situation 
The comparison of the explanations given by the students in our research showed that, irrespective of 
their age, the majority of them expressed very similar, and in many cases identical, ideas. As we have 
shown elsewhere [12][13] the persistence of the ideas identified across the different ages was the 
result of a common way of reasoning based on similar analogies arisen, in turn, from similar 
observations students made in their everyday life. The only difference that the older students (aged 15 
and 17 years) attempted to synthesize their ideas with something they learnt or heard merely by 
involving some scientific terminology in their explanations without, however, showing any 
understanding (correct or incorrect). 
There were also cases in which older students who made an incorrect prediction, and were then 
asked further about their explanations, showed that they were aware of the scientific idea but they did 
not access it.  Students aged 15 and 17 years who predicted that the box with the elephant falls faster 
showed that they were aware of Galileo’s experiments when they were questioned further about their 
explanations. They showed a correct understanding of free fall and this way they produced a response 
conflict. Such responses show that these students did not lack the scientific information to reason 
about the situation with p-prims derived from their experiential knowledge coexisting with the scientific 
one but it was actually these that were more easily accessible. 
 
3.1. Final thoughts 
The findings of our study indicated that students had a fragmentary understanding and that their ideas 
were not theoretically grounded but rather, as we have shown elsewhere [12] [13], were based upon 
their experiential knowledge. Although the purpose was not to judge the merits of one perspective 
over the other, but rather, to consider which of the two perspectives provides a better means of 
understanding the ideas expressed in our study, we support their interpretation from a p-prims 
perspective as students were appeared to string together pieces of knowledge in response to the 
contextual features of the novel situations.  
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